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speak in detail—even if we felt competent to do justice to it. As to the philosophical content of the book,—it is in our opinion hardly possible, *for the historian*, to rationalize completely, as our author aims to do, the Socratic doctrine and life. The author has undoubtedly done just the right thing in emphasizing the testimony of Aristotle, and so ridding the name of Socrates of a large portion of the burden of vulgarity left upon it by the philosophically incompetent hands of Xenophon; but it seems a rather too violent abstraction from the conditions of Greek life and society at any period of their existence to make of Socrates all but a complete modern ethical rationalist. One cannot help admiring, however, the clearness and strength of the philosophical conviction which, in part at least, Herr Joël reads into the life and teaching of Socrates. Criticism would be more in place at this time if we had before us the promised second volume which is to deal with the individual and social ethics of the *Memorabilia*. We must note, however, that the present volume, which is (necessarily) very largely purely philological in character, would have been more serviceable for the *philosophical* student if the author had given in every section of it a careful summary of results obtained. We also note a certain degree of diffuseness and unnecessary repetition, due in part, no doubt, as intimated in the author's preface, to the external circumstances of the composition of the work. On the whole, the work, though largely philological, merits careful attention from philosophical students.

B. C. BURT.

Die Hauptprobleme der Philosophie, in ihrer Entwicklung und theilweisen Lösung, von Thales bis Robert Hamerling. Von VINCENZ KNAUER. Wien & Leipzig, 1892, W. Braumüller.—pp. xxvi, 408.

This book consists of a course of fifty-three lectures given to beginners in philosophy in the university of Vienna. They extended over the whole academic year, and are apparently published exactly as they were delivered, without the excision either of the 'asides' in which the professional mind loves to dispose of the topics of the day, or of the witticisms which form so effective a *káthapors* of the *ennui* which the gravity of the subject may have engendered in the hearers. Hence the book is distinguished by a greater lucidity and liveliness of style than we are wont to expect from a German work, while the defects of its qualities appear in the air of hasty dogmatism which the absence of fuller discussion, references, and notes sometimes gives to its summary treatment of very disputable points. It may be

doubted whether publication in such a form was needful or desirable at all, and there can be no doubt that it puts great obstacles in the way of serious criticism. For though the critic make every allowance for the excellent reasons which the author no doubt reserves *in petto*, he cannot but feel the insufficiency of the actual statements made. It is unfortunate, also, that the title of the book should be decidedly misleading. It is *not*, as one might have expected, a history of philosophic problems, but a history of philosophy in outline, and the title simply serves as an excuse for a divergence from the traditional estimates of the relative importance of the various systems. Up to Aristotle the narrative follows the customary lines, but the interval between Aristotle and Descartes is all but ignored, as are the English philosophers, with the exception of Bacon (who is regarded as the founder of modern science), and the successors of Kant, with the exception of Herbart. It is clear, therefore, that the book does not supply a satisfactory sketch of the history of philosophy. And still less is it adequate as an account of the history of the chief philosophic problems. It raises the question, — What is philosophy? — answers it provisionally by ‘the opinions of the philosophers,’ and fails to give not only any final reply, but also a definite list of the chief philosophic problems, which the learner is left to piece together as best he may in the course of the lectures. Even so, he will hardly find anything bearing on what is surely not the least of these problems, *viz.*, that of the relations of man and God, while the whole subject of epistemology is left obscure by the author’s persistent suppression of the skeptical objections, which the various and curious theories of knowledge were designed to meet. Of course, if nothing is said of the Pyrrhonists and Hume, if the sophists are met with the pooh-pooh of ‘common-sense,’ the theories of the Neo-Platonists and Neo-Kantians may well seem to have been prompted by mere superfluity of naughtiness. On the other hand the account, *e.g.*, of Plato and Aristotle contains a good deal of detail which is irrelevant to any particular ‘problem of philosophy.’ But to descend to the criticism of particulars. Professor Knauer, who is an ardent partisan of Aristotle, is inclined to exaggerate his difference from Plato, and so overlooks the fact that at the end of much criticism the great disciple has a habit of re-stating his master’s doctrine in somewhat different words. This is probably the explanation of the trouble which Aristotle’s psychology has at all times given to his commentators. It begins, as usual, by a polemic against the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. The soul is the “form,” *i.e.*, the moulding principle, of a *particular* body,

and not transferable. But upon Aristotelian, no less than upon Platonic, principles the form is "prior to" the "matter." On other occasions this priority does not create a stumbling-block, owing to the co-eternity of form and matter, which guards against a temporal interpretation, but in the case of the soul the temporal succession is just the *datum explicandum*. Is it, then, astonishing that Aristotle should have discovered no better way out of the difficulty, no better way of harmonizing the strict individuality of the soul with the priority of the form, *which must here be taken temporally*, than his obscure doctrine of the νοῦς ποιητικός? It is true that he ascribes to it all the attributes he had censured in the Platonic doctrine of pre-existence; but does he not do precisely the same thing in his doctrine of the universal after his criticism of the Platonic ideas, and is not the relation of the δευτέρα to the πρώτη οὐσία just as obscure as that of the νοῦς ποιητικός to the νοῦς παθητικός? Professor Knauer, who follows Brentano rather than Zeller in his account of the *De Anima*, tries to read modern Creationism into Aristotle, according to which the immortal part of the soul is created out of nothing and combined with the body by the will of God. And this in spite of the facts that Aristotle elaborately refutes the idea (*e.g.*, *Metaph.*, XI, 9) that the perfect would be in any way conscious of the imperfect, that there is not the least trace of a conception of creation in Aristotle, and that the idea of creationism is assuredly no less difficult than that of the νοῦς ποιητικός! Professor Knauer appears to greater advantage in his treatment of the problem of the One and the Many. He is a decided opponent of Monism, admires Leibniz and Herbart, and considers Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel to have added nothing to Spinoza. Monism, as he rightly insists, is helpless in face of the problem of change, which begins to be intelligible only when a plurality of existences has been admitted. But it may not be amiss to remark that, even according to Herbart, change is only appearance, which does not affect the inner nature of the "reals," and that the possibility of a real and intrinsic change is what we are concerned to assert for many scientific and ethical purposes. Moreover, as already stated, pluralism cannot be regarded as established until the question of the relation of God to the Many has been discussed, and such discussion is here entirely lacking. The book concludes with an extremely eulogistic account of the philosophic writings of the poet Hamerling, who, however, does not seem to offer anything of sufficient originality and interest to justify his admirer's claim that he has for the present said the last word in philosophy.